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In light of  the  growing international competition among states  and  globally 
operating companies for  limited natural resources, export restrictions on  raw 
materials have become a popular means for governments to strive for various goals, 
including industrial development, natural resource conservation and environmental 
protection. For instance, China as a major supplier of many raw materials has been 
using its powerful position to both economic and political ends. The European Union 
(EU), alongside economic heavyweights such as the US, Japan and Mexico, 
launched two high-profile cases against such export restrictions by China at the WTO 
in 2009 and 2012. Against this background, this paper analyses the EU’s motivations in 
the initiation of trade disputes on export restrictions at WTO, particularly focusing on 
the two cases with China. It argues that the EU's WTO complaints against export 
restrictions on raw materials are to a large extent motivated by its economic and 
systemic interests rather than political interests. The EU is more likely to launch a WTO 
complaint, the stronger the potential and actual impact on its economy, the more 
ambiguous the WTO rules and the  stronger the internal or external lobbying by 
member states or companies. This argumentation is based on the analysis of 
pertinent factors such as the economic impact, the ambiguity of WTO law on export 
restrictions and the pressure by individual member states on the EU as well as the role 
of joint complaints at the WTO and political considerations influencing the EU’s 
decision-making process. 
 Mirko Woitzik 
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Introduction 
“There is oil in the Middle East; there is rare earth 
in China…” (Deng Xiaoping, 1992)1 
 
In light of growing international competition among states, globally operating 
companies and limited natural resources,2 export restrictions3 on raw materials have 
become a popular means for governments to attempt to achieve various goals 
including industrial development, natural resource conservation and environmental 
protection.4  As trade is vital for securing access to such raw materials –  with no 
country being entirely self-sufficient5 – export restrictions in the form of export taxes, 
quotas, licensing or minimum export prices on finite or renewable raw materials such 
as minerals or agricultural commodities can have a deleterious effect on global 
welfare, according to the WTO World Trade Report 2010.6 This is especially true when 
applied by a large country, as reducing the supply to world markets leads to higher 
international prices, puts inflationary pressures on poorer countries and fuels 
international tensions.7   
While restrictive measures on exports have always been part of a government’s 
policy toolbox, a new form of strategic use of such policies became apparent in 
September 2010: at that time, China’s temporary ban on rare earth exports to Japan 
evolved into a maritime incident in the East China Sea and a subsequent political 
quarrel between the two countries.8 This event marked the “drawing of a line in the 
sand” according to Kingsnorth:9  first, it raised global awareness on China’s quasi-
monopoly on the production of a number of raw materials important  to foreign 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Krugman, Paul, “Rare and Foolish”, New York Times, 17 October 2010. 
2 For reasons of simplicity, this paper uses the terms ‘natural resources’, ‘raw materials’ and 
‘strategic minerals/metals’ interchangeably. 
3 This paper understands export restrictions as “measures directly affecting exports” as broadly 
defined in the WTO’s Trade Policy Review papers. Further, this paper makes no distinction 
between export duties and export taxes. Taken from: Kim, Jeonghoi, “Recent Trends in Export 
Restrictions”, OECD Trade Policy Papers, no. 101, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2010, pp. 5-6. 
4 UNEP, ITC & ICTSD, “Trade and Environment Briefings: Export Restrictions”, ICTSD Programme 
on Global Economic Policy and Institutions, Policy Brief, no. 2, June 2012, International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, p. 1. 
5 Ibid., p. 1. 
6  World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2010 –  Trade in Natural  Resources, WTO 
Publishing, Geneva, 2010, p. 42. 
7 Kim, op.cit., p. 11. 
8 Zajec, Olivier, “China – Herr über die seltenen Erden” (China – Master of the rare earths), Le 
Monde diplomatique, no. 9342, 12 November 2010, p. 1. 
9 Kingsnorth, Dudley J., “The Global Rare Earths Industry: A Delicate Balancing Act”, Deutsche 
Rohstoffagentur (German Raw Material Agency), 16 April 2012. EU Diplomacy Paper 6/2013 
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manufacturing industries,  as well as on the  unreliability of China as a long-term 
supplier of these. Second, in light of former president Deng Xiaoping’s famous 
expression  quoted above, it also revealed the country’s willingness to use this 
economic power as leverage to political ends. Third, the incident again fuelled the 
debate on how China has built up its strategic position to create trade-distorting 
effects, systemically giving domestic downstream industries a competitive 
advantage over foreign competitors by providing cheaper access to raw materials 
through the imposition of export restrictions. 
Having failed to make  any substantive progress with China  as regards restrictive 
measures in bilateral fora, the EU, alongside the US and Mexico, launched  a 
complaint at the WTO concerning export restrictions on  several raw materials 
introduced by China in 2009.10 Having prevailed in the Appellate Body’s ruling in the 
beginning of 2012, the EU – together with the USA and Japan – then filed another, 
different complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) on the question of 
export restrictions on rare earths, tungsten and molybdenium in March 2013.11  
Considering predictions that the issue of export restrictions is likely to be a permanent 
one – as some raw materials are finite and demand is growing12 –, the present paper 
intends to analyze the EU’s motivations in the initiation of trade disputes on export 
restrictions within the framework of the WTO. While particularly focusing on the 
above-mentioned cases of China - Raw Materials13 and China - Rare Earths,14 the 
underlying overall objective is to examine a broader set of  factors  –  economic, 
systemic and political  –  which influence the EU’s decision-making process with 
regard to the submission of complaints before the WTO DSB. 
                                                 
10 WTO cases arise between two governments, but in many cases more than one member is 
affected by the same measure. Then, one Panel can be established to hear the 
complainants in one formal disputes. See  Sindico, Francesco, “Access to minerals: WTO 
export restrictions and climate change considerations”, Polinares – Working Paper, no. 59, 
December 2012, p. 8; and European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, “EU requests 
WTO panel on Chinese export restrictions on raw materials – Factsheet”, Brussels, 4 November 
2009. 
11 European Commission, “EU challenges China's rare earth export restrictions”, IP/12/239, 13 
March 2012, Brussels. 
12 UNEP, ITC & ICTSD, “Trade and Environment Briefings: Export Restrictions”, op.cit., p. 4. 
13  Appellate Body Reports, “China  –  Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials”, WT/DS394/AB/R/WT/DS395/AB/R/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012 (short: 
China – Raw Materials). 
14 Official short title for DS432 “China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten and Molybdenum”. Mirko Woitzik 
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The paper relies on a catalogue of criteria, on the basis of which the EU’s economic, 
systemic and political motivations are successively assessed. First, bearing in mind 
that economic interests are at the heart of every case initiated by the EU at the 
DSB,15 the assessment of the economic motivations based on the EU is challenging 
export restrictions on raw materials will rely upon two indicators: one referring to the 
potentiality of economic impact, the other to the actual economic effects within the 
EU. The first indicator will be based upon the concept of criticality, introduced in the 
2010 EU report on critical raw materials.16 It examines the potential economic impact 
on the EU’s economy by looking at three aspects: the economic importance of the 
raw materials in question in terms of value-added of 17 broad sectors for the EU’s 
manufacturing sector, the supply risks and the EU’s degree of import dependence 
on these materials. The second indicator will focus on the extent to which EU 
companies, including both producers and processors, have to face serious 
competitive disadvantages compared to China’s domestic downstream industry, 
and potentially cope with losses of employment and production capacities in the 
EU.17 
Second, the analysis of the systemic  motivations  which  push  the  EU  to  initiate 
complaints against export restrictions on natural resources will again rely upon two 
indicators. The first of these will be the EU’s intention of creating a precedent of WTO 
case law,18 especially in the absence of clear WTO rules on export restrictions and a 
lack of clarity in the relationship between the GATT and WTO Accession Protocols by 
new WTO members. The second will focus on the degree to which the EU seeks to 
guarantee external coherence and respond to pressure by individual EU member 
states (on behalf of their respective industries) –  either via external lobbying  or 
internally through the member states in the Trade Policy Committee of the Council. 
Third, in light of the interesting question of how political motivations play a role in the 
decision-making process considering the increasing number  and  length  of some 
WTO cases, the examination of the political motivations will once again rely upon 
                                                 
15 Interview with EU Official, European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 14 March 2013. 
16 European Commission, op.cit., pp. 5-8. 
17 European Commission, “EU challenges export restrictions on rare earths“, MEMO 12/182, 13 
March 2012, Brussels, p. 2. 
18 In light of Article 3.2. Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the provision of security and 
predictability to the international trade system is a central element. In the absence of a 
binding rule, this can be considered as a soft precedent for similar  cases, as recently 
confirmed by the Appellate  Body  in  US  -  Clove Cigarettes  –  stating that panels ought to 
ensure the core idea of this article. EU Diplomacy Paper 6/2013 
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two indicators. On the one hand, the EU’s willingness to send a political message to 
the defendant to abide by the international trade rules will be scrutinised. Here, the 
structure and the decision-making process of the EU are especially interesting 
regarding the issue of retaliatory measures. On the other hand, the role of the other 
complainant parties and the degree to which they influence the decision-making 
process in the EU from the consultation phase to the actual contentious phase 
before the DSB deserves a closer analysis. 
After the core analysis of the EU’s economic, systemic and political motivations in the 
initiation of WTO complaints on export restrictions on raw materials, this paper’s final 
section summarises the main findings and draws the conclusion that the EU is more 
likely to launch a WTO complaint, the stronger the potential and actual impact on its 
economy, the more ambiguous the WTO rules and the stronger the internal and 
external lobbying by member states or companies.  
 
Analysis: China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths 
Economic motivations I: The potential economic impact 
In its Raw Material Strategy of 2008, coined “The Raw Materials Initiative — Meeting 
Our Critical Needs for Growth and Jobs in Europe”, the EU already acknowledged 
that it would not be able to manage the transformation towards a more sustainable 
production as well as environmentally friendly products without using these so-called 
strategic metals.19  At the same time, it stated that “Europe is a supply chain 
economy” that procures its raw materials from “every part of the world” to empower 
its manufacturing industry, thus underlining the importance of free global trade for EU 
companies.20 
The following section first assesses the potential impact of export restrictions on raw 
materials on the EU’s economy by looking at the economic importance of the 
concerned  raw materials, the risks of supply and the EU’s degree of import 
dependence on these materials. In a second step, the extent to which the EU 
industry is actually affected by these aforementioned measures will be analysed. The 
analytical focus lies here on the resulting competitive disadvantages compared to 
                                                 
19 European Commission, The Raw Materials Initiative – Meeting Our critical Needs for Growth 
and Jobs in Europe, op.cit., p. 3. 
20 European Commission, Raw Materials Policy – 2009 Annual Report, Brussels, op.cit., p. 8. Mirko Woitzik 
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China’s domestic downstream industry and the potential loss of employment and 
production capacities in the EU. 
Economic importance of concerned raw materials 
Raw materials play a significant role for high-tech and green business applications, 
so-called  ‘environmental technologies’,  as they increase energy efficiency and 
reduce  CO2  emissions. They are especially used in the automotive, equipment, 
chemicals and hi-tech electronics industries  as well as for renewable energy, 
construction, machinery and modern aircraft production.21 In its efforts to evaluate 
the most crucial and economically important raw materials for its industries, the EU – 
calculating the value-added of 17 broad sectors covering almost 90% of total value-
added for the EU’s manufacturing sector in 2006 –  has identified 14 critical raw 
materials out of 41 potential candidates.22  Four of these  figure on the list of raw 
materials whose restricted access the EU has been, and still is, challenging in the 
selected WTO cases.23 Among these are magnesium and fluorspar in the first case, 
and rare earths and tungsten in the second case. Considering only EU imports in non-
energy industrial materials such as rare earths and other natural resources, their 
amount accounted for about 10% of overall imports to the EU in 2010, amounting to 
EUR 142 billion.24  
Against this background, the EU’s  economy and its industries rely to a significant 
degree on raw materials which – despite their general use in only small quantities – 
constitute the foundation of numerous industrial value chains of technologically 
sophisticated products within the EU.25 Regarding their future economic importance 
to the EU, a report of the German Ministry of Economy and Technology stated that 
due to rapid technological change, the demand for raw materials by driving 
emerging economies is expected to evolve rapidly by 2030,  making trade more 
important, but also increasing the likelihood of bottlenecks.26 
                                                 
21 Korinek, Jane & Kim, Jeonghoi, “Export Restrictions on Strategic Raw Materials and Their 
Impact on Trade and Global Supply”, in OECD, The Economic Impact of Export Restrictions on 
Raw Materials, Paris, OECD, 2010, pp. 104-105. 
22 European Commission, Critical Raw Materials for the EU – Report of the Ad-hoc Working 
Group on defining critical raw materials, Brussels, 30 July 2010, pp. 16, 22. 
23 Ibid. 
24 European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, “EU Trade Policy for Raw Materials 
Second Activity Report”, Brussels, 30 May 2012, pp. 4-5. 
25 Ibid.; see also Korinek & Kim, op.cit., pp. 104-105. 
26 European Commission, Critical Raw Materials for the EU – Report of the Ad-hoc Working 
Group on defining critical raw materials, op.cit., p. 7. EU Diplomacy Paper 6/2013 
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Risk of supply 
In addition to the evident economic importance of the selected raw materials for 
the EU, the risk of supply of these resources is a significant factor for the EU when 
challenging China’s export restrictions. Indeed, in a report on critical raw materials, 
the EU points out itself that an upstream bottleneck in the supply of raw materials has 
the potential to ”threaten the whole value chain”27 of technological innovation.28  
First of all, many of the raw materials at issue in both WTO cases are produced in only 
a small number of countries.29 While some of them are almost entirely produced in a 
single country, the production of many of them is often concentrated in three 
producing countries or mining regions, including China, Russia, South Africa and the 
US.30 The case of China is particularly interesting in this regard: having a high share of 
world production in a number of raw materials, China has great influence on 
reducing or increasing the risk of supply, merely due to the concentrated production 
of, for instance, rare earths, tungsten and magnesium.31  
Second, in many cases, China’s high share of global production of raw materials is 
accompanied by a low level of substitutability as well as low recycling rates.32 This 
holds particularly true for the natural resources that are the object of EU complaints 
at the WTO. Substitution is limited in the cases of fluorspar and tungsten both due to 
high costs of alternatives or current technologies and apparent loss of performance – 
with regard to the technical and environmental aspects.33 
Third, an additional risk for a secure supply of raw materials is the environmental risk, 
that is,  the intention of a country to protect its environment and, in doing so, 
endangering the supply of raw materials. Four of the selected raw materials in the 
WTO cases are particularly exposed to countries' measures of environmental 
                                                 
27 Ibid., p. 24. The report takes into account the political and economic stability, the level of 
concentration of raw materials, the availability of substitutes and recycling and the so-called 
environmental risk. 
28  European Commission, Tackling the Challenges in Commodity Markets and on Raw 
Materials, op.cit., p. 12. 
29 Mildner, Stormy-Annika, “Securing Access to Critical Raw Materials: What Role for the WTO 
in Tackling Export Restrictions? -  Four Proposal for a Transatlantic Agenda”, Transatlantic 
Academy Paper Series, Washington, D.C., December 2011, p. 3. 
30 Korinek & Kim, op.cit., pp. 107-108. 
31 China’s share in world production of these strategic minerals accounts for: 96.99% for rare 
earths, 93% for magnesium, 91% for tungsten, 36% for molybdenum and 20.22% for 
manganese. See European Union, “Economic Importance of Selected Raw Materials”,  12 
September 2012.  
32 European Commission, Critical Raw Materials for the EU – Report of the Ad-hoc Working 
Group on defining critical raw materials, op.cit., p. 7. 
33 Ibid., pp. 36-38. Mirko Woitzik 
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protection: rare earths, magnesium, fluorspar and tungsten. The poor environmental 
performance by China according to the World Bank EPI index not only explains in 
part China’s will to control damaging mining practices, but also makes the recourse 
to means such as export restrictions appear to be all the more likely in the future.34 
Import dependence 
Last but not least, despite having been undervalued by the EU in its strategic papers 
on critical raw materials, the EU’s high import dependence is often said to be one of 
the most important factors  for the EU when it comes to securing raw materials – 
making it vulnerable to price volatility and interruption in supply chains.35 With regard 
to the strategic minerals in both WTO cases, the EU’s import dependency often 
amounts to far more than 50%.36 Combined with the fact that China is the largest 
producer of many raw materials, the economic vulnerability towards this single 
country is far greater than towards any other exporting country of raw materials – as 
exporting countries with a large market share will have by definition a stronger 
influence on world prices.37 
Economic motivations II: The actual effect on the EU's economy 
Perhaps even more important than the potentiality of being economically exposed 
and affected by China’s restrictive measures on raw materials exports, is the actual 
economic impact that the EU is facing. This includes a double pricing system, loss in 
market shares, limited access to raw materials and loss of employment within the EU. 
Generally speaking, export restrictions on strategic minerals result in an economic 
impact which can be distinguished from that of other materials or products, due to 
their  particular features. These include  their  high importance to the EU’s industrial 
value chain, concentrated production, few substitutes and high import 
dependence.38 According to findings of the EU Ad-hoc Working Group, restrictive 
Chinese measures on strategic minerals cause an increase in global prices for these 
materials while also distorting global competition for downstream industries,  given 
that Chinese processing industries have access to cheaper raw material supply than 
                                                 
34 European Commission, Critical Raw Materials for the EU – Report of the Ad-hoc Working 
Group on defining critical raw materials, op.cit., pp. 36-38. 
35 Mildner, “Securing Access to Critical Raw Materials”, op.cit., p. 3. 
36 European Commission, Critical Raw Materials for the EU – Report of the Ad-hoc Working 
Group on defining critical raw materials, op.cit., pp. 77-81. 
37 Bellmann & Wilke, op.cit., p. 199. 
38 Korinek & Kim, op.cit., pp. 104-105. EU Diplomacy Paper 6/2013 
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do, for instance, EU competitors.39 This can be considered as “an implicit subsidy for 
the domestic processing industries, providing them with an artificial advantage”, and 
resulting in the distortion of the level playing field that is guaranteed and provided for 
under international trade rules, especially WTO agreements.40  Chinese processing 
firms then increase competition on the EU and international markets by offering, for 
instance, molybdenum products below actual costs, thanks to the local purchasing 
edge.41  
In order to shed light on the high economic interests at stake  for the EU, the 
Commission published figures regarding the total added value, as well as EU jobs 
directly or indirectly depending on the raw material industry. According to official 
documents, the EU business sector dealing with raw materials provides a total added 
value of EUR 1300 billion, employing approximately 30 million people within the EU. 
Also, the EU’s imports of  these natural resources accounted for  a third of all EU 
imports, if energy imports are included. Leaving aside the energy industrial materials 
and focusing on rare earths and other raw materials, the imports weighed about 10% 
of overall imports to the EU at a value of EUR 142 billion.42  
Against this background, China’s policy measures on strategic minerals can have the 
effect of  reducing  to a very small circle EU manufacturing companies in metals, 
increasing the dependency of leading-edge industries on monopolistic supplies, and 
result in the  loss of a sector of the EU’s economy.  This is even before taking  into 
account  the meaningful costs  in terms of loss of know-how and research and 
development capability.43 
Bearing in mind that the economic impact of restrictive export measures is difficult to 
assess,44  the question of whether the EU has been affected or not, and to  what 
extent, still needs to be raised. A brief analysis of the example of rare earths will help 
to shed light on this matter. According to EU sources, the impact of export restrictions 
                                                 
39 European Commission, Critical Raw Materials for the EU – Report of the Ad-hoc Working 
Group on defining critical raw materials, op.cit., p. 23. 
40 Kim, op.cit., p. 13. 
41  Plansee, “Impacts of export restrictions on an EU company in the refractory metals 
industry”, Conference on the EU Trade Policy and Raw Materials, European Commission, 
Brussels, 29 September 2008, p. 2. 
42 Ibid., p. 4-5; see also European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, “Raw Materials”, 
Brussels, 28 January 2013. 
43  Hilpert, Hanns Günther & Kröger, Antje Elisabeth, “Chinesisches Monopol bei Seltenen 
Erden: Risiko für die Hochtechnologie” (China's Monopoly on Rare  Earths: Risks for High-
Technology), DIW-Wochenbericht, no. 19, 2011, p. 7. 
44 UNEP, ITC & ICTSD, “Trade and Environment Briefings: Export Restrictions”, op.cit., p. 1. Mirko Woitzik 
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on rare earths has been both the most significant and the most visible.45 While some 
rare earth elements have seen drastic price increases of up to 1000% after the quota 
tightening by China in 2010, average export prices for all 17 rare earth elements are 
generally up to 100% higher compared to Chinese domestic prices.46 As a result of 
this, EU companies were either obliged to abandon production of some products, 
increase final prices or relocate to China for a more viable access to raw materials.47 
Already in 2009, an independent analysis by the OECD found that export quotas and 
taxes imposed by China forced non-Chinese rare earth processors to pay 30% more 
for the supply, excluding costs  for transportation and storage.48  Different sources 
confirm that quotas imposed by China on rare earths have been significantly 
reduced from 2010 to 2012, with the level of demand being approximately 66% 
higher than the actual level of supply.49  This evidently leads to tremendous 
competition among global operators in need of  these metals, creating high 
uncertainty for all EU businesses across the value chains as far as predictable supply 
and stable global market prices are concerned.50 
Systemic motivations I: The defence and ambiguity of WTO law 
Following its 2008 Raw Material Strategy, the EU has increasingly emphasised the 
importance of the enforcement of trade rules at the WTO in its subsequent reports on 
raw materials. In light of the length of DSB procedures and the subsequent absence 
of direct economic relief for EU companies, the idea of considering the merits of 
initiating WTO procedures, not only for the purpose of lifting export restrictions on vital 
raw materials, but also to create “important case law so as long as existing GATT 
rules lack clarity and are limited in scope” has been increasingly vocalised, 
particularly  by  the Ad-hoc Working Group.51  Furthermore, as  the Commission 
exclusively represents the EU member states in trade matters,  the influence of 
important member states is  thought to be decisive in the EU’s decision-making, 
especially regarding the issue of external coherence. 
                                                 
45 European Commission, “EU challenges export restrictions on rare earths”, pp. 1-2. 
46 European Union, “Economic Importance of Selected Raw Materials”, op.cit. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Korinek & Kim, op.cit., p. 118. 
49 Kingsnorth, “The Global Rare Earths Industry: A Delicate Balancing Act“, op.cit. 
50 Korinek & Kim, op.cit., pp. 116-120. 
51 European Commission, Critical Raw Materials for the EU – Report of the Ad-hoc Working 
Group on defining critical raw materials, op.cit., p. 9. EU Diplomacy Paper 6/2013 
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The following section thus scrutinises in a first step the EU’s intention of defending 
international trade rules and of creating a precedent of WTO case law, especially in 
the absence of clear WTO rules on export restrictions, before looking in a second 
step at the degree to which the EU seeks to guarantee external coherence among 
its member states and responds to internal or external pressure by individual EU 
member states. 
The defence of international trade rules 
The EU expresses its clear support for the multilateral trade system and aims to ensure 
that others abide by their WTO obligations.52  Regarding  export restrictions on raw 
materials, some experts argue that the WTO and its dispute settlement procedure 
“stand at the center of the EU’s trade enforcement strategy”.53 Bearing in mind the 
EU’s objectives to deter other countries from applying export restrictions,54 one can 
assume that the EU saw a clear interest in defending WTO rules by bringing forward 
both cases against Chinese export restrictions. It was widely considered that the 
result of China - Raw Materials would furthermore have far reaching implications for 
the whole WTO system in general.55  The reason for this will be scrutinised in the 
following section. 
The lack of clear WTO rules on export restrictions 
Since the EU has started the two ‘high-profile’ cases at the WTO against Chinese 
export restrictions, it has become well-known that the current WTO rules on the use of 
restrictive measures on exports are far less sophisticated than those governing the 
use of imports. Whereas export duties such as taxes are not explicitly addressed at all 
in the GATT, quantitative restrictions are forbidden according to Article XI:1 GATT, 
although exceptions to this provision remain quite unclear.56 Those exceptions are, 
inter alia,  the protection of human, animal, plant life and health as well as the 
conservation of natural exhaustible resources in Art. XX (b) and (g) GATT. Moreover, 
when China joined the WTO in 2001, it agreed to eliminate all taxes and charges on 
                                                 
52  European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, What is Europe's Trade Policy?, 
Brussels, 2009, p. 4. 
53 Mildner, “Securing Access to Critical Raw Materials”, op.cit., p. 4. 
54 Ibid. 
55  Zhixiong, Huang, “EU-China Trade Disputes in the WTO”,  International Review of Wuhan 
University, vol. 6, 2007, p. 321. 
56 Bellmann & Wilke, op.cit., p. 198. Mirko Woitzik 
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exports  as part of the Accession Protocol  with the exception of  some materials 
explicitly listed in the Annex and measures taken according to Article VIII GATT.57 
This constellation lead to the core problems in both WTO cases, especially China – 
Raw Materials:  on the one hand,  the rights available under the GATT and other 
international law to apply export restrictions on domestic natural resources and, on 
the other hand, the applicability of GATT exceptions to commitments made by a 
WTO member in its Accession Protocol.58  In  China  –  Raw Materials, China’s 
argumentation was twofold: first, it argued that it had the right to regulate exports of 
its raw materials on the basis of the principle of sovereignty over natural resources 
recognised under general public  international law.  Second, China stated that it 
could invoke the exceptions and derogations available in Articles XX and XI to justify 
its export regime, even though it goes against the obligations contained within its 
Accession Protocol.59  These exceptions include the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources, the protection of public health and the relief of critical shortages 
of products essential to the exporting country.  
The EU’s rationale when going to the WTO is primarily an economic one; yet, 
according to some interviewees, a very welcome side effect of important cases is 
the establishment of a solid legal basis by clarifying existing WTO provisions.60  This 
holds particularly true for cases which tackle a so-called systemic problem. As the EU 
has a clear stance in favour of free trade and against export restrictions of any kind, 
unless justified under WTO law,61 both China - Raw Materials and China - Rare Earths 
could easily create incentives to other governments to impose export restrictions on 
raw materials.62 
As mentioned before, China - Raw Materials has led to important clarifications and 
“may dissuade at least some countries” from applying China’s policy of export 
restrictions.63 First, the Appellate Body threw light on the matter of how principles of 
international law relate to the interpretation of WTO exceptions, finding that these do 
not permit a WTO member “to derogate from the commitments it had undertaken 
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under the WTO system”.64 Second, it also clarified the relationship between the GATT 
and a WTO member’s Accession Protocol, ruling that if exceptions to Article XX GATT 
on export restrictions were to be legitimately invoked by a WTO member, the 
Accession Protocol “must expressly provide for such measures”.65 
The EU thus welcomed this first ever ruling on export restrictions on natural resources,66 
especially since the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body can be considered as 
having the effect of a soft precedent with regard to the duty to ensure “security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system”  under Article 3.2 DSU.67  Hence, 
regarding the still ongoing China  –  Rare Earths  dispute, the established soft 
precedent obviously had an important impact on the EU’s decision to start a second 
and similar WTO complaint against Chinese export restrictions and raised the EU’s 
chances of success. 
Systemic motivations II: The Commission as the member states’ mandataire? 
The  next step will be to assess  the degree to which EU member states and the 
industries concerned have influenced the Commission into taking up the issue and 
finally pursuing it before the WTO DSB. Therefore, both external and internal influence 
processes, such as lobbying or via the Trade Policy Committee of the Council will be 
examined. 
Among  the  EU member states with considerable interests in the secure and 
predictable supply of raw materials are Germany, France and Italy. Germany’s 
metal resources are almost non-existent; its industrial demand for these resources, 
however, is one of the world’s largest, and its imports amounted to approximately 
EUR 22 billion in 2010.68 A study of the Kfw Group in 2011 identified very critical natural 
resources for Germany, including both tungsten and rare earths, for its automobile, 
renewable energy, engine-building and chemical industries.69 As a net importer of 
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metallic resources, France is highly dependent on trade for its supply.70 Although its 
industrial sector only accounted for 13% of the GDP in 2012, France’s automobile, 
aviation, defense and chemical industry still rely heavily on the import of metallic 
materials, especially molybdenum, aluminium and rare earths which are at stake in 
the cases before the WTO.71  Similarly, Italy as the EU’s second largest steel producer 
and consumer is highly dependent on imports of raw materials, especially aluminium, 
zinc and fluorspar.72  
The means of internal lobbying 
As part of the decision-making framework of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy, 
the TPC has formally only a consultative function, but decisions taken within this 
former ‘Article 113 (133) Committee’ are usually followed by the Commission.73 The 
Commission mostly initiates a case at the WTO after the consultation of the TPC, as 
the consensus-based approach in EU trade policy rarely requires the transfer to 
COREPER and subsequently the Council. 
According to interviews conducted by the author, unanimous support among all EU 
member states was given in the concerned WTO cases for a number of reasons: first, 
raw materials  figure high-up  on the agenda since the EU’s first strategy in 2008. 
Second, many European industries are reliant on them and consumers and workers 
risk being negatively affected in case of shortages. Third, divisions of protectionist 
versus liberal EU member states are nonexistent in export restriction matters on raw 
materials, as all of them have a clear stance against such measures. Finally, the 
enforcement of WTO commitments according to the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda  is a top priority for  member states,  especially as there are not many 
supplying countries in raw materials. However, the launching of a WTO complaint is 
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also the recognition of failure of bilateral talks as well as being time and resource 
consuming, so it is considered as a last resort for the EU.74 
Regarding the internal lobbying in both WTO cases, interviews revealed a certain 
reluctance of EU companies  to collaborate  with the Commission on information 
gathering regarding the impact of China’s export restrictions.75 This is due to fears of 
retaliation, particularly significant with regard to China, and as a result companies 
have through national governments actually been slowing down the proceedings 
that would lead to  a  potential WTO complaint.76  The restricted number of firms 
concerned by a stable raw material supply further aggravated this issue. 
The process of external influence 
According to some  interviewees, the external pressure exercised by some EU 
companies and respective member states –  reluctant to share information and 
pursuing a more diffuse lobbying approach –  has had a bigger impact on the 
Commission’s action than internal lobbying in setting the subject of export restrictions 
high on the agenda and eventually bringing a case to the WTO.77 
First, important and vocal national federations such as the Federation of German 
Industries have actively been putting pressure on other EU member states and the 
Commission itself to challenge Chinese export restrictions on raw materials by linking 
them to a possible offshoring of hi-technology industries and green businesses from 
Germany.78 
Second, even more challenging to the EU are national raw material strategies 
adopted by a number of member states, including bilateral cooperation 
agreements  to  secure  the supply of raw materials  between governments and 
individual companies.79  For  example,  the  French-based group Rhodia  concluded 
supply contracts with, inter alia, Australia.80 
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It was in the Commission’s interest to guarantee fair access to and a secure supply of 
raw materials by challenging the WTO-inconsistent measures on exports applied by 
China. This was expected to prevent further action from individual member states 
that would undermine external EU coherence and avoid interstate competition over 
the access to precious raw materials. 
Still, the question remains whether the Commission partly pursued its own institutional 
interests, particularly when considering the fears of retaliation against EU companies 
which rely on Chinese raw material imports. Bearing in mind the reluctance of EU 
member states and respective companies when challenging China at the WTO, the 
Commission has the possibility to link the issue at stake to a more general judicial 
problem in WTO law.81 In this way, the Commission reinforces the image of the EU as 
a defender of multilateral trade rules and thus its presence in international trade 
politics.82 
Political motivations I: Sending a political message? 
Finally, to assess the so-called  “politico-strategic rationale”  of the EU’s WTO 
complaints on export restrictions on raw materials, this section  will examine the 
political motivations. It looks first at the EU’s willingness to send a political message or 
retaliate against another WTO complaint brought by China, before scrutinising the 
role and influence of the other complainants and their political objectives. 
First of all, the politico-economic circumstances surrounding both complaints, but 
especially China - Rare Earths, must be seen in light of the overall stalemate in EU-
China trade relations. Despite a growing  number of high-level fora, controversial 
issues such as the EU’s granting  of ‘Market Economy Status’ to China, the arms 
embargo, the EU’s trade deficit and the failure of the negotiations for a Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement overly politicise their relationship.83 In addition to this, 
fears of a “fully fledged trade war“84 might already have become a reality over the 
last few of years: the EU has launched several anti-dumping investigations against 
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China, even specifically targeting Chinese imports from downstream producers that 
have supposedly benefitted from its exports restrictions on raw materials.85 
Second, in the context of increasing trade frictions between the EU and China, the 
issue of retaliation has risen to the top of the EU’s and other countries’ agendas.86 
Under WTO law, retaliation  is clearly prohibited in Article 3.10 of the DSU which 
established the principle of good faith. Yet, the EU has been suggesting that 
countries like China may tend to start WTO disputes in the wake of EU investigations 
or cases brought before  the WTO, including the solar panel case.87  Concerning 
China - Rare Earths, fears of retaliatory measures against EU companies or the EU 
itself were also present; but by acting jointly with the US and Japan, the EU hoped to 
avoid similar raw material cuts to those that targeted Japan in 2010.88 Still, only nine 
days after the start of the case, China announced  that  it would impose anti-
dumping duties on photographic paper imports from the EU, the US and Japan.89 
Third, regarding the question  of whether the EU’s action in the WTO cases is also 
politically motivated, it can be argued that the EU’s internal structure  –  with the 
consensus-based involvement of different Directorates-General of the Commission 
and member states – only partly allows for this. Within the EU, once the issue has 
been raised by EU member states in the TPC, the Commission’s Directorate General 
for Trade starts to investigate and gather information on economic, systemic and 
judicial impacts.90  Based on a consensus-based recommendation of the TPC, the 
Trade  Commissioner then takes the decision of whether to proceed to the 
diplomatic negotiating stage of a WTO dispute or not.91 There is an acknowledged 
margin for political deliberation on the Commissioner’s level.92 However, once the 
dispute reaches the contentious stage and a panel is established, the Legal Service 
of the Commission takes over –  putting forward the legal side of the case and 
cooling down political tensions, if they existed.93  
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Political motivations II: The role of the other complainants 
To further assess the political circumstances surrounding the EU’s action at the DSB 
against China’s export restrictions, the role of the other complainants – namely the 
United States, Japan and Mexico – including their influence on the EU's decision-
making process is considered in the next section.  
The fellow complainants: the USA, Japan and Mexico 
When the US launched China - Raw Materials at the WTO in 2009, shortly after Barack 
Obama became President, experts presumed that this closely watched case was a 
first move of the new US administration to show its willingness to put more pressure on 
China to abide by the rules of the international trade system.94 Even more so, China - 
Rare Earths was said to have strong political incentives “to look tough on China” as 
2012 was an election year, with Obama aiming to prove his rigorous stance on trade 
matters and outbid the Republicans’ rhetoric against China with concrete 
administrative action.95 Similarly, Japan’s move in 2012 to complain against Chinese 
export restrictions marked the first time ever that the country had sued China at the 
WTO, demonstrating  both an evident political decision as well as its enormous 
economic import dependence on China with regard to rare earths.96 When Mexico 
joined the EU and the US in China – Raw Materials in 2009, this showed that not only 
industrialised countries were complaining against China but also emerging 
economies.97  
The impact on the EU's decision-making process 
These circumstances had several consequences for the EU: the EU benefited in both 
WTO cases from the ‘troika’, especially in the first case. According to EU officials, the 
US were in the leadership position allowing for the EU to go along while taking the 
back seat.98 In China - Rare Earths, although being more active in the elaboration 
and preparation of arguments, the EU stood in the shadow of the tough stance of 
the Obama administration on China, as well as Japan’s politically motivated action. 
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This is particularly important when dealing with China since retaliation against EU 
companies, as mentioned above, is a wide-spread phenomenon and suing China in 
a larger alliance puts the complainants in a less tenuous position. Furthermore, with 
regard to economic, judicial and political cooperation as well as the coordination 
between the complainants, independent observers have assessed an 
“unprecedented concerted action”99 between the EU, the US and Japan in China – 
Rare Earths, thus underlining the global significance of the issue.100 
Conclusion 
This paper analyzed the EU’s motivations in the initiation of trade disputes on export 
restrictions on raw materials within the framework of the WTO, particularly focusing on 
the two ‘high-profile’ cases with China in recent years. To this end, a broader set of 
indicators  –  economic, systemic and political –  that influence the EU’s decision-
making process with regard to the submission of WTO complaints was established 
and subsequently examined.  
First, the indicators measuring the economic motivations  that  push  the EU to 
introduce complaints at the WTO underline that the EU’s economic interest always 
needs to be strong when going to the WTO. On the one hand, the potential 
economic impact of export restrictions by China on certain identified raw materials – 
four of them being the object of both WTO cases – was found to be significant to the 
EU. On the other hand, the real economic  effects on EU companies due to the 
existing Chinese trade restrictions are also very important, especially in the rare earth 
sector. Concrete examples demonstrated how double pricing, supply uncertainty 
and loss of market share to Chinese downstream industries clearly affect EU 
industries. Hence, in light of the indicators discussed, the EU’s economic motivation, 
influenced by its willingness to alter both its vulnerable and economically exposed 
position regarding restrictions on certain raw materials, can be considered as highly 
significant. 
Second, the indicators measuring the systemic motivations have revealed interesting 
insights. In light of breaches of WTO law and a need for clarification of  the 
relationship between the GATT, China’s Accession Protocol and general principles of 
international law, the EU’s systemic concern in both WTO cases was high. Moreover, 
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contrary to the assumption that it was primarily the internal pressure of EU member 
states with strong economic interests that led the Commission to act at the WTO, 
external lobbying  seemed to be even more important,  given the companies’ 
reluctance to cooperate because of fears of retaliation. This is why the Commission – 
certain of the member states’ support – pursues partially its own institutional interests 
which are of a more judicial nature. Thus, the EU’s systemic motivation in challenging 
export restrictions on natural resources can be considered as significant, being 
strongly influenced by its defence of WTO law and the need for clarification of the 
rules governing international trade. The EU is of course also motivated by its constant 
pursuit  of  external coherence in  the  light of internal and, even more so,  external 
pressure by individual EU member states and companies. 
Third, the indicators measuring the political motivations of the EU have illustrated that 
the EU’s internal structure does not enourage the pursuit of political interests at the 
WTO. The EU benefits from its co-complainants’ more assertive political reasoning in 
the WTO cases, taking the backseat and thus being less exposed to China’s potential 
retaliation. Further, if its partners are economic powers, the EU also benefits from the 
political and systemic importance of the WTO cases and, if won, is then able to send 
a stronger political message to the defendant party.  
All in all, this study has revealed that in the context of complaints against export 
restrictions at the WTO, the EU’s motivations are to a large extent economic and 
systemic and to a minor extent political. The EU’s approach is therefore rather 
following “pure business” and “law enforcement” interests than pursuing “sheer 
politics”. Overall, the EU is more likely to launch a WTO complaint, the stronger the 
potential and actual impact on its economy, the more ambiguous the WTO rules 
and the stronger the internal or external lobbying by member states or companies. 
The relevance of the study –  despite having contributed to the yet largely 
unexplored field of the EU‘s use of the WTO DSB regarding the recent phenomenon 
of export restrictions on raw materials – must also be seen in the larger context of the 
EU‘s challenges at the WTO. The catalogue of criteria, while not claiming to be 
exhaustive in any sense, can be used to examine the EU‘s intentions in different cases 
at the WTO; yet, the significance of systemic and political interests might not be 
given to the same extent as raw materials are currently high on the WTO members‘ 
agendas. Further research in closely connected areas could, for instance, focus on 
the EU‘s motivation in filing complaints at the WTO against economically weaker EU Diplomacy Paper 6/2013 
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WTO members as well as on  the impact of unimplemented measures by the 
defendant party on the EU‘s interests at the DSB after having been previously 
successful. 
Given the lack of substantial literature on the EU‘s use of the WTO as well as the 
topicality of the research subject (export restrictions on raw materials), the paper 
primarily had recourse to policy analysis, research papers and interviews. In addition, 
export restrictions on strategic raw materials are a recent phenomenon, and  the 
existence of only two cases – both concerning China – renders generalisation rather 
difficult; further cases in the future can therefore reveal new details that might 
complete the picture of EU motivations at the WTO DSB. 
This study opened with a quote of Deng Xiaoping revealing that China would plan to 
use its reserves of raw materials not only for economic development but also as 
leverage  for political ends. Analyzing the EU’s WTO complaints against China’s 
export restriction in this regard demonstrated the EU’s willingness to make China 
abide by the rules of international trade, not because of political intentions as one 
might expect, but for economic and systemic reasons. This further underlines the EU’s 
commitment to tackling  political abuse of economic power by insisting on and 
reinforcing the WTO’s rule-based system. 
 Mirko Woitzik 
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